

APPEAL NO. 040856
FILED JUNE 7, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 19, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury to the discs at the L4-5 and L5-S1 intervertebral levels of his spine on _____, in addition to his compensable injury of a lumbar strain; and that the claimant had disability from January 8, 2003, through the present. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the extent-of-injury and disability determinations were supported by insufficient evidence. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The parties stipulated that on _____, the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his low back and that the carrier accepted compensability of a lumbar sprain/strain. We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

Disability is also a question of fact. Disability can be established by a claimant's testimony alone, even if contradictory of medical testimony. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92285, decided August 14, 1992; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92167, decided June 11, 1992.

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence on the issues of extent of injury and disability, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge